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Abstract
Despite ample evidence of ambiguity preferences in individual decision
making, experimental studies of ambiguity eﬀects in ﬁnancial markets are
scarce and inconclusive. Although a number of theoretical studies ex-
plain empirical puzzles in ﬁnance with ambiguity preferences, it is not a
given that individual ambiguity eﬀects survive in markets. We therefore
combine the predominant design for ambiguous prospects in individual
decision making, the two-color Ellsberg urn, with predominant designs
in ﬁnancial trading, the double auction and the call market, and com-
pare trading in risky and in ambiguous assets. Our results suggest that
markets are able to wash out ambiguity eﬀects, which we do observe in
an individual decision making control. We ﬁnd no eﬀects on transaction
prices or quotes and also no eﬀects on volume, volatility, or portfolios.
This applies both to double auctions and call markets, with and with-
out simultaneous trading of risky and ambiguous assets, and even in the
absence of arbitrage.
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1 Introduction
Many real life decisions are characterized by ambiguity, where we lack impor-
tant information, such as objective probabilities of the relevant states. Keynes
(1921) proposed a simple thought experiment to illustrate the eﬀects of ambi-
guity.
Imagine "[...] the two cases following of balls drawn from an
urn. In each case we require the probability of drawing a white ball;
in the ﬁrst case we know that the urn contains black and white in
equal proportions; in the second case the proportions of each color
is unknown, and each ball is as likely to be black as white. It is
evident that in either case the probability of drawing a white ball is
1
2 , but that the weight of the argument in favor of this conclusion is
greater in the ﬁrst case." (Keynes, 1921, Chapter VI.6)1
Ellsberg (1961) used this experimental design, commonly referred to as the `two-
color Ellsberg urn`, to show that a preference for the risky urn (with known prob-
abilities) over the ambiguous urn (with unknown probabilities) violates Subjec-
tive Expected Utility Theory and the Sure-thing Principle of the Savage axioms
(Savage, 1954). Since then a large body of individual choice experiments con-
ﬁrmed that decision makers are, on average, ambiguity averse when confronted
with the above quoted choice.2
Ambiguity preferences are a possible cause for a number of empirical puz-
zles in ﬁnancial economics, which expected utility theory would consider to be
(behavioral) anomalies. After the development of several non-expected util-
ity models of individual decision making that considered ambiguity preferences
(e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato et al., 2004; Klibanoﬀ et al.,
2005; Nau, 2006), a growing number of theoretical papers incorporated ambi-
guity eﬀects into market models to explain long-standing anomalies in ﬁnance,
like the equity premium puzzle (Epstein and Wang, 1994; Maenhout, 2004; Cao
et al., Winter 2005; Leippold et al., 2008), portfolio inertia (Epstein and Wang,
1994; Illeditsch, 2011), the familiarity bias and the home bias in investments
(Uppal and Wang, 2003; Huang, 2007; Cao et al., 2011), ampliﬁcation eﬀects
(Routledge and Zin, 2009; Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2010; Illeditsch, 2011), and
1Keynes (1921)did not use the term ambiguity. Instead, he referred to `the weight of
arguments`, but was not sure about this concept. In fact, at the beginning of the Chapter
VI he writes: "[A]fter much consideration I remain uncertain as to how much importance to
attach to it." (Keynes, 1921, Chapter VI.1)
2For excellent overviews, see Camerer and Weber (1992), Wakker (2010), Etner et al.
(2012). Note that individuals can also be ambiguity seeking, for example, if the probability
of winning is very low (e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Curley and Yates, 1989; Kahn and
Sarin, 1988). Where possible, we therefore refer to the more neutral terms `ambiguity eﬀects`
or `ambiguity preferences`, although the average empirical response to the two-color Ellsberg
urn is ambiguity aversion.
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asymmetric reactions to good and bad news (Epstein and Schneider, 2008; Ep-
stein et al., 2010; Illeditsch, 2011).
Yet, it is not a given that ambiguity eﬀects in individual decision making
survive when market forces are at work. In markets, subjects` decisions are
no longer independent, but are subject to market feedback from other traders.
According to the standard neoclassical argument, market mechanisms and in-
centives should reduce behavioral biases and non-expected utility behavior, in-
cluding ambiguity eﬀects (Camerer, 1987).
Despite the burgeoning theoretical literature and the promising explanatory
potential of ambiguity preferences, evidence on the impact of ambiguity in ex-
perimental ﬁnancial markets is very limited and rather mixed. Studies that
combine the predominant design for ambiguous assets in individual decision
making, the two-color Ellsberg urn, with predominant market designs in experi-
mental ﬁnancial trading, the double auction and the call market, are particularly
scarce. Therefore, the main contribution of this paper is to test whether ambi-
guity eﬀects arise and survive in ﬁnancial trading environments, by providing a
simple, direct and simultaneous comparison between an ambiguous asset, based
on two-color Ellsberg urn, and a corresponding risky asset in double auctions
and call markets.
A chronological description of our experiment best explains the treatments
and their results. We started with a standard double auction market where
subjects were able to simultaneously trade a risky and an ambiguous asset , but
in two diﬀerent markets on a split screen. To provide more room for ambiguity
eﬀects we stayed as close as possible to individual decision task settings: by
separating the two markets with dedicated trading account for each market, we
eliminated the possibility to arbitrage between risk and ambiguity; and by dis-
playing both markets on the same screen, we increased the salience of ambiguity,
as shown by Fox and Tversky (1995). Depending on the results of this treat-
ment, the plan was to proceed into one of the following two directions: in case
of ambiguity eﬀects, we planned to test their robustness in a more integrated
ﬁnancial market with arbitrage. In case of no ambiguity eﬀects, we planned
to give them more room by administering a call market with less intra-period
market feedback. The results from the double auction market experiment did
not show any ambiguity eﬀects on transaction prices, bids, asks, volume, volatil-
ity, or share distributions in traders` portfolios. Accordingly, we administered
a call market treatment, while taking great care to keep all other aspects un-
changed. Again, we did not observe systematic ambiguity eﬀects on any of the
above mentioned variables. We therefore degenerated the two sided call mar-
ket setting into an individual auction against the computer by implementing
a BeckerDeGrootMarschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). This
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was meant to test whether our operationalization of ambiguity was suﬃcient
to produce ambiguity eﬀects in individual decision making. As expected, sub-
jects` individual willingness to pay (WTP) for the risky asset was signiﬁcantly
greater than for the ambiguous asset. However, although these results supported
our operationalization of ambiguity, alternative methods might have been even
stronger. The latter could explain, why related studies discussed further below
(e.g., Sarin and Weber, 1993) found some ambiguity eﬀects in markets, while we
did not. As a robustness check we therefore ran the BDM treatment again, but
produced the ambiguous asset with a compound lottery, which was also used in
Sarin and Weber (1993). The diﬀerence between the WTP for the risky and the
ambiguous assets turned out to be smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant. Hence,
it seems that our original operationalization of ambiguity has been suﬃciently
strong, supporting the notion that market forces washed out ambiguity eﬀects
in the double auction and call markets.
The paper complements a small number of experimental studies on ambigu-
ous assets in markets. To the best of our knowledge, Camerer and Kunreuther
(1989) are the ﬁrst to study ambiguity eﬀects in experimental markets. They ad-
ministered open outcry double auction markets for insurance coverage against
risky and ambiguous hazards that produced only losses. The markets were
separated without opportunities for arbitrage and ambiguity was operational-
ized through compound lotteries (second-order probabilities), also referred to
as `weak ambiguity`. The authors conclude that "[t]he eﬀects of ambiguity are
rather minor and mixed" (p.287), with conﬂicting eﬀects on the number of insur-
ance contracts held at the end of trading and no eﬀects on prices. By contrast,
we used strong ambiguity and study its eﬀects in the gain domain.
Bossaerts et al. (2010) used a double auction environment to experimentally
investigate the simultaneous trading of assets with state-dependent dividends
where state probabilities were either risky or ambiguous. They administered
a three-color Ellsberg urn, where the payoﬀs from the risky and the ambigu-
ous asset are not independent from each other, and they let subjects learn
about the composition of the ambiguous urn by drawing balls without replace-
ment. The authors acknowledge that this reduction in ambiguity on prices could
be confounded with convergence to equilibrium, "because it is diﬃcultif not
impossibleto assess when prices have `settled down` during an experimen-
tal period." (p.1351) Moreover, their setup requires the computation of state
price/probability ratios with a number of assumptions on priors and updating.3
3As there exists no theory for updating under ambiguity, the authors "follow the simplest
approach and use uniform priors over the ambiguous states for the initial draw, updated by
Bayes' Rule for subsequent draws." (p.1347) Although recent evidence points into the direction
of Bayesian learning under ambiguity, it also suggests that subjects might over-adjust/under-
adjust to contradictory/conﬁrming signals. (Qiu and Weitzel, 2013)
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Bossaerts et al. conclude that ambiguity aversion matters only partially: "The
predictions for portfolio choices seem quite robust and well supported by the
experimental data; the predictions for prices are less robust." (p.1355) By con-
trast, we excluded updating under ambiguity and ensured independent payoﬀs
by contrasting a two-color Ellsberg urn with a separate risky urn.
Kocher and Trautmann (2013) designed two separate ﬁrst-price sealed bid
market environments for risky and ambiguous assets and allowed subjects to
self-select into one of two, mutually exclusive markets. Hence, as in our study,
arbitrage between risk and ambiguity was not possible. The ambiguous asset
was operationalized with a two-color Ellsberg urn. Although most subjects chose
to submit a bid in the risky market, average transaction prices for both types of
assets were equal across markets. By contrast, we allowed all subjects, without
prior self-selection, to trade both types of assets in double auction and call
market environments. Moreover, risky and ambiguous assets were not traded in
mutually exclusive environments, but simultaneously.
The study of Sarin and Weber (1993) is most related to our experimental
setting: in 14 markets the authors explored several combinations of treatment
eﬀects, including sealed bid auctions vs. open outcry double auctions, indepen-
dent vs. simultaneous trading of risky and ambiguous assets (with arbitrage),
experienced executives vs. students as traders, smaller vs. larger number of
trading periods, low vs. equal probability levels, and the framing of ambiguity
as nature vs. expert judgments. In all treatments, compound lotteries were
used to operationalize (weak) ambiguity. Sarin and Weber (1993) report in-
conclusive results when risky and ambiguous assets were traded independently.
When traded simultaneously, market prices for ambiguous assets were signiﬁ-
cantly lower. The authors acknowledge that this is unexpected, as simultaneous
auctions allow for arbitrage.4 Note, however, that this result is based on only
four markets (including both sealed bid auctions and double auction markets),
which constitute the entire experimental evidence on the simultaneous trading
of risky and ambiguous shares with independent outcomes. We complement
these market experiments with a greater number of independent observations,
strong ambiguity, no arbitrage in simultaneous trading, and an individual deci-
sion making BDM control.
As the designs of prior studies diﬀer quite substantially, it is not surprising
that results are mixed. For better comparability and interpretability this paper
attempts to provide a simple and direct test with well-known design features.
With regard to individual ambiguity eﬀects we can clearly replicate prior studies.
4"It seems that a more transparent comparison between the unambiguous and ambigu-
ous assets leads to a greater diﬀerential in market prices (simultaneous versus independent)
contrary to our expectation." (Sarin and Weber, 1993, p.612)
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However, when exposing these eﬀects to basic market mechanisms, ambiguity
does not seem to play a role anymore.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental de-
sign, followed by a discussion of the results and robustness checks. Section 4
concludes.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Overview
Table 1 provides an overview of the experiment. In total, 176 subjects par-
ticipated in eight sessions. We ran four sessions with double auction markets
(DA, twelve independent markets with eight subjects each), two sessions with
call markets (CM, six independent markets with eight subjects each), and two
sessions with BDM evaluations (WTP, individual observations of 32 subjects).
Each experimental session consisted of twelve consecutive and identically de-
signed periods. Subjects traded or evaluated risky assets (R) and ambiguous
assets (A), which we both referred to as shares. The shares were traded in
two markets, which we administered separately, but simultaneously on a split
screen. To avoid any reference to risk or ambiguity we referred to the shares on
the two sides of the split screen as blue and yellow shares. All monetary values
were denominated in experimental currency units (ECU) with an exchange rate
of 200 ECU per Euro.5
2.2 Risky and ambiguous asset
The risky and the ambiguous asset paid either a high or a low dividend
(300 or 124 ECU), which were announced at the end of each period. We follow
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and determined the dividend payments by drawing a
ball from an urn that contained eight balls with (up to) eight colors. If the drawn
ball matched one of four winning colors, the corresponding asset paid the high
dividend (and, otherwise, the low dividend). As the probability for drawing
a winning color is 0.5 we replicate the underlying objective probabilities of a
two-color Ellsberg urn.
The four winning colors were determined as follows. Upon arrival, and with-
out any information about the experiment, each of the 24 subjects selected four
colors by independently and privately marking them on a sheet with eight col-
ors. Hence, each of the 24 sheets indicated four privately chosen winning colors.
The 24 sheets were pinned on the lab wall, organized in two columns: one col-
umn with twelve sheets, one for each period, represented the winning colors
5In the experiment we referred to one ECU as 'Taler'.
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of the risky assets; the other column with twelve sheets, one for each period,
represented the winning colors of the ambiguous assets.
For the risky asset, we publicly ﬁlled an urn with exactly eight diﬀerent
colors. After each period, a subject drew one ball from the risky urn (with
replacement) and we compared the drawn color with the winning colors for that
period to determine the dividend.
To operationalize ambiguity, twelve diﬀerent urns (one for each period) were
created as follows. For each session we invited four additional subjects, who
stayed in the waiting room outside of the lab. After the other 24 subjects were
seated and marked their winning colors, we asked the additional subjects to each
ﬁll three urns with exactly eight balls in any color combination of their liking.
We provided eight transparent jars, each ﬁlled with 144 balls (small marbles)
of one of the eight colors, and placed them on a table in the front of the lab.6
We then gave each of the additional subjects three empty urns and concealed
the table with blinds. Neither the experimenters nor the other subjects were
able to see how the additional subjects ﬁlled the ambiguous urns (one by one)
behind the blinds. None of the subjects had any further information about the
experiment. After the additional subjects handed over their ambiguous urns,
we placed all twelve urns (one for each period) in a random sequence on a
separate table in full view of the other subjects. We then privately paid each
of the additional subjects a ﬁxed fee of six Euros and dismissed them.7 After
each period, a subject drew a ball from one of the twelve ambiguous urns to
determine the dividend of the ambiguous asset. The ambiguous urn was then
removed so that the dividend payment of each period was determined with a
new ambiguous urn.
As a robustness check for our main operationalization of ambiguity, we also
used a compound lottery to produce a weakly ambiguous urn (with second-order
probabilities) in Session BDM2. In line with, e.g., Sarin and Weber (1993),
Abdellaoui et al. (2011), and many others, we implemented (computerized)
lotteries with uniform distributions to determine the composition of colors in
the ambiguous urn. A random draw of this urn then determined the dividend
of the ambiguous asset, as described above.
2.3 Double auction market
We used a standard computerized continuous open-book double auction market
in which eight participants traded for twelve periods. Each trading period lasted
6We chose 144 marbles so that it was in principle possible to ﬁll all twelve urns with only
one color.
7The blinds stayed around the table with the jars throughout the whole experiment so that
nobody (also not the experimenters) could see the remaining balls. To make sure that there
were eight balls in each ambiguous urn, we counted the number of marbles through the fabric
of the urns (bags).
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four minutes. Traders could both sell and buy shares with limit orders or direct
trades. For limit orders a new bid/oﬀer had to be higher/lower than outstanding
bids/oﬀers.
The screen was organized in such a way that it simultaneously displayed
two independent markets on the left and right hand side (see Figure 1 in the
appendix). In Session DA1 and DA2, traders simultaneously faced risky assets
in one market and ambiguous assets in the other.8 Hence, Session DA1 and
DA2 directly contrasted the ambiguous with the risky asset, which makes the
ambiguous alternative more salient and pronounces ambiguity eﬀects, at least
in individual decision making (Fox and Tversky, 1995). As a robustness check,
we also ran sessions that mimic the setup of Sarin and Weber (1993), where
assets are traded without a direct contrast: in Session DA3 all traders faced
risky assets in both markets, while in Session DA4 all traders faced ambiguous
assets in both markets on the split screen.
At the beginning of each trading period, subjects were endowed with one of
two endowment proﬁles. In DA1 and DA2, one half of the traders received 10
risky shares and 4200 ECU cash in the risky market and 6 ambiguous shares
and 5200 ECU cash in the ambiguous market; and the other half received 6
risky shares and 5200 ECU cash in the risky market and 10 ambiguous shares
and 4200 ECU cash in the ambiguous market. In all endowments, 3000 ECU
of the cash portion was provided as a loan and had to be returned at the end
of each period.9 The same endowment proﬁles applied to DA3/DA4, but with
risky/ambiguous shares only. Arbitrage across markets was not possible and
short sales were not allowed. As explained in the introduction, we wanted to
give ambiguity eﬀects ample room to survive.
2.4 Call market
The main motivation for the CM treatment was to reduce the within market
feedback. We therefore took great care to only adjust the market design and
to keep everything else (e.g., endowments, split screen allocation of markets,
ambiguity operationalization) as close as possible to the DA treatment. In each
market, traders submitted the maximum quantity of shares they are willing to
buy/sell and the highest/lowest price they are willing to pay/accept (see Figure
2 in the appendix). After all subjects have entered their trades, the computer
matched the buy and sell orders to determine a market price for each of the
two CMs on the screen and then cleared each of the two markets separately.
8We counter-balanced R and A on the left and right hand side of the split screen: four
traders (randomly determined) always traded the risky asset on the left hand side and the
ambiguous asset on the right hand side of the split screen, and the other four traders vice
versa.
9No subject went bankrupt.
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We used the same programming code and implementation as Cheung and Palan
(2012).10
2.5 Individual Decision Making
In eliciting the individual WTP of subjects for the risky and the ambiguous
asset we, again, used the split screen partitioning to stay close to the appearance
of the other treatments (see Figure 3 in the appendix). We implemented the
BDM mechanism as follows. Subjects submitted their willingness to pay for one
share in each of the two markets in twelve subsequent periods. The computer
drew a random price for each market. If the subject's stated willingness to pay
exceeded the random price, the subject purchased the share at the random price;
otherwise, the subject did not purchase the share. As the WTP only applied to
one share, we had to adjust the dividend by a factor of ten (high/low dividend:
3000/1240 ECU) and the endowment to 3500 ECU (including a 500 ECU loan).
In the Session BDM1 we operationalized ambiguity as in all DA and CM
sessions by inviting additional subjects who produced ambiguous urns (see Sec-
tion 2.2 above). To ensure that this operationalization of ambiguity was strong
enough, we repeated the treatment in a Session BDM2 with ambiguity based
on a compound lottery (see above).
2.6 Final Payment
For the ﬁnal payment, we employed the random incentive system (Starmer and
Sudgen, 1991; Hey and Lee, 2005). At the end of the session one of the twelve pe-
riods was individually and randomly selected (with a twelve-sided dice). Within
the payoﬀ-relevant period we selected one of the two markets of the split screen
(left or right) with a coin ﬂip. Traders in the DA and CM sessions received the
end-of-period net cash plus the dividends of their share holdings. Subjects in
the BDM treatments were paid according to their WTP and the outcome of the
BDM mechanism.
2.7 Procedure
All subjects were recruited from a broad student databases across several ﬁelds
of study using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We only invited subjects, who have
never participated in asset market experiments before.11 All DA and CM ses-
sions and BDM1 were run in November 2011, December 2011 and July 2012
at the University of Düsseldorf (Germany). BDM2 was run in November 2012
10We thank the authors for providing their zTree code.
11To minimize the confounding eﬀects and variance arising from gender compositions in
experimental assert markets (as shown in Eckel and Fullbrunn (2012)), we only invited male
students in the DA and BDM sessions. In the CM sessions, two markets also include female
traders. As our results do not diﬀer for female traders or markets, we do not report them
separately.
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at the University of Nijmegen (The Netherlands). The experiment was entirely
computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). The duration per session was ap-
proximately 1.5 hours for which subjects received an average payment of 20.06
Euros.12
The sequence of events was as follows. Upon arrival, subjects marked the
winning colors and the additional subjects ﬁlled the ambiguous urns and were
then dismissed (except in BDM2). In the DA and CM sessions, market par-
ticipants were then trained in using the computer interface. Step by step we
explained how to buy and sell, and subjects had a trial round to get accus-
tomed to the interface. After the trial round, we carefully explained the actual
experiment, in particular, the determination of the dividend payments.13 We
then privately answered remaining questions and started the ﬁrst of the twelve
payoﬀ-relevant periods. At the end of the session, subjects answered a short
demographic questionnaire, were paid in cash and dismissed.
3 Results
In analyzing the data we search for ambiguity eﬀects in three categories of mar-
ket variables: market prices (incl. bids and asks), trading volume and volatility,
as well as portfolio composition in subjects` end-of-period share holdings.14 For
robustness we also check whether our operationalization of ambiguity generates
ambiguity eﬀects on individual decision making and how strong these eﬀects
are in comparison to an alternative operationalization (compound lottery). All
results are analyzed per period to identify possible learning eﬀects. Unless men-
tioned otherwise we use a 95 percent conﬁdence interval as standard level of
statistical signiﬁcance (p < 0.05).
3.1 Prices, bids, asks
We start with the analysis of prices in the DA, where the risky and the ambigu-
ous assets are traded simultaneously (Sessions DA1 and DA2), by computing
the diﬀerence between the median market prices for R and A for each period
12BDM 2 was half an hour shorter than the other sessions (1 hour).
13All instructions and ztree codes are available from the authors upon request.
14This is in line with the theoretical literature, which suggests three areas where ambiguity
eﬀects may be particularly important. First, ambiguous assets may command a return pre-
mium and therefore trade at lower prices, as suggested by models that attempt to explain the
equity premium (Epstein and Wang, 1994; Maenhout, 2004; Cao et al., Winter 2005; Leippold
et al., 2008). Second, higher uncertainty about ambiguous assets may result in less trad-
ing (lower liquidity) and higher price volatility, as theoretical literature on portfolio inertia,
excess volatility and ampliﬁcation eﬀects suggests (Epstein and Wang, 1994; Routledge and
Zin, 2009; Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2010; Illeditsch, 2011). Third, some traders may overweight
their portfolio with less ambiguous assets, as implied by models on the home bias and the
familiarity bias (Uppal and Wang, 2003; Huang, 2007; Cao et al., 2011).
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and market. The ﬁrst part of Table 2 reports the corresponding results, includ-
ing averages across markets. A positive diﬀerence indicates ambiguity aversion,
because the market price of A is subtracted from R. The p-values refer to two-
sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the Null that the diﬀerences are equal to
zero. As Table 2 shows for DA, no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in prices
exist with a single exception in Period 3. In a robustness check we also compare
the prices of R in DA3 with A in DA4, but do not ﬁnd any ambiguity eﬀects.15
The results of the DA also apply to the CM. The second part of Table 2
reports the corresponding clearing price diﬀerences between R and A. Again,
no statistically signiﬁcant price diﬀerences can be detected.
Note that the diﬀerences for the DA are medians of a four minute trading
period. Learning through market feedback could therefore be an explanation
for the insigniﬁcant results in the DA, even in the very ﬁrst trading period.
However, if learning eliminates ambiguity eﬀects, we would expect diﬀerences
in prices in the early periods of the CM. In the CM setting, market feedback
about prices is only available at the end of a period, which implies that, if
ambiguity eﬀects exist at the outset, they cannot be reduced by learning in the
ﬁrst period, but only across periods. Although the average diﬀerence in the very
ﬁrst period in the CM is relatively high (61.83), it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
This provides little support for learning as an explanation for missing price
diﬀerentials.16
As market prices are formed by the marginal trader it is possible that am-
biguity eﬀects primarily manifest themselves in the order book, rather than
transaction prices. For example, even if the transaction prices for R and A are
equal, it is possible that the bids for R are all fairly close to the clearing price
(indicating relatively homogenous risk preferences), while higher heterogeneity
in ambiguity preferences creates an order book for A where bids deviate more
strongly downwards. This notion is in line with Bossaerts et al. (2010), who
report a high heterogeneity in traders` ambiguity preferences. To test possible
ambiguity eﬀects on order books we compute the median bid diﬀerence and the
median ask diﬀerence between R and A in CM. As the results in Table 2 (third
and fourth part) show, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in asks and
only one period with diﬀerences in bids, which are, however, negative. Again,
as observed with transaction prices, we also ﬁnd for bids and asks that the dif-
ferences in the very ﬁrst period are positive and relatively high (compared to
subsequent periods), but not statistically signiﬁcant.
15For brevity, we only report simultaneously traded assets in Table 2. Detailed results on
DA3 and DA4 are available upon request.
16For robustness, we also analyzed the trading pattern in the ﬁrst period of the DA on a
minute-by-minute basis, but did not detect any ambiguity eﬀects in the ﬁrst or subsequent
minutes.
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Hence, overall, we can conclude that we do not ﬁnd any ambiguity eﬀects on
market prices, bids, or asks. This applies to double auctions and to call markets.
3.2 Volatility and volume
To test ambiguity eﬀects on price volatility we compute the diﬀerences between
the standard deviation of prices of R and A in DA1 and DA2.17 Table 3 reports
the results per period and market (sR − sA). Overall, we ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the volatility of R and A (with Period 3 as only
exception).
Table 3 also reports the diﬀerences between the volume of R and A in si-
multaneous trading in DA and in CM (qR − qA). A positive/negative number
indicates that more risky/ambiguous shares have changed hand. In the DA
markets we ﬁnd only two out of twelve periods with statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in trading volume: in Period 6 and Period 10 more ambiguous (not
risky) assets were traded. In the CM treatments there is not a single period
with signiﬁcant diﬀerences in trading volume.
3.3 Portfolio composition
As the total amount of shares in the market is constant, we focus on diﬀerences
in the distribution of shares in traders' portfolios. Speciﬁcally, if ambiguity
leads to greater disagreement about the value of assets, some traders under-
weight/overweight ambiguous assets to a greater extent than risky assets.
We use two measures for possible diﬀerences in portfolio composition. First,
we compute the diﬀerence of the standard deviation of end-of-period share hold-
ings in R and A (disR − disA). Negative values result from a more heteroge-
neous distribution of ambiguous shares in traders` portfolios, indicating higher
disagreement about the value of A. Second, as an alternative measurement, we
compute the diﬀerence of the share holdings of the two traders with the highest
number of shares in their end-of-period inventory (hR − hA ). Again, negative
values indicate more polarized holdings of the ambiguous assets.
Table 4 shows the results per period and market for simultaneously traded
assets in DA and CM. We ﬁnd not a single period in which the end-of-period
distribution of R signiﬁcantly diﬀers from A.
17Note that CM treatments do not provide continuous trading data for intra-period volatil-
ity.
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3.4 Robustness checks: individual decision making and
operationalization of ambiguity
Given that we hardly ﬁnd any ambiguity eﬀects in markets, it is important to
test whether our operationalization of ambiguity is suﬃcient. In Session BDM1
we therefore elicited subjects` WTP with a BDM mechanism (as described in
Section 2.5) and computed the individual bid diﬀerentials between assets R and
A. Table 5 reports the average per period across all subjects. As expected,
the average bids for A are lower in all periods (BidR − BidA > 0), and in
the majority of periods this diﬀerence is also statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover,
the average diﬀerential across all periods and markets in Session BDM1 is also
statistically signiﬁcant .
Although these results show that our operationalization works in individual
decision making, it could still be possible that alternative operationalizations of
ambiguity used in related studies are even stronger. The latter could explain
why, for example, Sarin and Weber (1993) ﬁnd ambiguity eﬀects in markets,
while we do not. To test this we implemented a compound lottery (used by, e.g.,
Sarin and Weber, 1993) in BDM2. Table 5 reports the average bid diﬀerentials
between R and A across all subjects. Although the average bids for A are lower
in most of the periods (with the exception of Period 12), only one of them is
statistically signiﬁcant.
Hence, overall, our primary operationalization of ambiguity by using addi-
tional subjects is not only suﬃcient to generate ambiguity eﬀects in individual
decision making, but also stronger than alternative methods used in related
studies.
4 Conclusion
Sarin and Weber (1993) conclude `that the market forces alone may not
be suﬃcient to wash out the eﬀects of ambiguity on decisions' (p. 616). Our
results, however, suggest that market forces may indeed be suﬃcient to wash
out the eﬀects of ambiguity. This raises the question: which mechanism leads
to the elimination of ambiguity eﬀects in markets, in particular with regard
to prices? An exhaustive answer goes beyond the scope of this study, but our
results provide some indications which mechanisms are less likely to be at work.
Market feedback may be an intuitive explanation for the absence of ambigu-
ity eﬀects. The crucial diﬀerence between markets and situations of individual
decision making is that, in markets, an individual's decision is inﬂuenced by de-
cisions of other market participants. As subjects trade they may learn that the
fundamental price of the ambiguous asset does not diﬀer from the risky asset,
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provided that there is a suﬃcient number of traders who attach the same value
to both assets. Consequently, prices converge, as also found by Sarin and Weber
(1993) for some of their independent market settings. Our results, however, do
not suggest that learning plays a role, neither within nor across periods. If mar-
ket feedback within a trading period would have been the crucial mechanism,
we would have expected to see ambiguity eﬀects in the CM, but not in the DA.
Market feedback across periods would have eliminated ambiguity eﬀects in later
periods in the CM, but not in the ﬁrst period. We do not ﬁnd any ambiguity
eﬀects in the CM, not even in the ﬁrst period.
Anticipation of (equal fundamental) asset prices in markets could explain
missing ambiguity eﬀects in the ﬁrst period of the CM. If this is true, we would
expect equal bids for risky and ambiguous assets in the individual WTP. Both
the BDM mechanism and the CM are incentive compatible. If a subject an-
ticipates a fundamentally equal price for risk and ambiguity, she should bid
accordingly in both the CM and BDM treatment. We do ﬁnd diﬀerences be-
tween the two treatments, however, with signiﬁcant ambiguity eﬀects in the
latter, but not in the former.
Another feature of many asset markets is that multiple items can be traded
while most individual decision making situations consider only one item. With
multiple items the main eﬀect of ambiguity may be hidden in other dimensions
than prices, such as portfolio choices. Bossaerts et al. (2010) provide some
support for this notion, but also acknowledge "a somewhat surprising state of
aﬀairs: much of asset pricing theory claims to make sharp predictions about
prices but much less sharp predictions about portfolio choices." (p.1355) In line
with the latter, we do not observe ambiguity eﬀects on portfolios, and also not
on other dimensions, such as trading volume, order books, or volatility.
Overall, our results call for caution in the analysis and interpretation of
ambiguity eﬀects in asset markets. This study suggests that the explanatory
potential of ambiguity preferences in ﬁnancial markets lies in settings that are
less straightforward than our experiment.
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Tables and Figures
`
Table 1: Overview of sessions
Session # Markets # Subjects ø Pay (Euros) Ambiguity
DA 1 3 3× 8 = 24 21.58 strong
DA 2 3 3× 8 = 24 19.42 strong
DA 3 3 3× 8 = 24 22.04 strong
DA 4 3 3× 8 = 24 19.17 strong
CM 1 3 3× 8 = 24 19.96 strong
CM 2 3 3× 8 = 24 22.90 strong
BDM 1 N/A 20 16.55 strong
BDM 2 N/A 12 16.85 weak
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Table 2: Diﬀerences between R and A: prices, bids, asks
The table reports diﬀerences between the risky asset (R) and of the ambiguous asset (A) in the
double auction (DA) and call markets (CM) for each market where R and A are traded simulta-
neously (Sessions DA1, DA2, CM1, CM2) and as a period average. PR − PA is the diﬀerence of
clearinghouse prices from CM and of median prices from DA. BR−BA is the median bid diﬀerence
and AR − AA the median ask diﬀerence between R and A in CM. Bids and asks are only included
when a subjects submitted quotes for both assets. The p-value refers to a Wilcoxon signed rank
test of the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence is equal to zero (that the measure of interest does not
diﬀer between assets R and A).
 
 
Period 
1 
Period 
2 
Period 
3 
Period 
4 
Period 
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
DA:                 
M1 49 -3 10 20 -20 -5 -10 -16 0 5 -22 0 
M2 -15 -8 17 -26 -10 1 -9 0 1 26 2 -10 
M3 0 5 5 -1 0 9 -5 -2 -5 -5 -9 0 
M4 60 17 12 -5 -16 13 0 2 2 0 -18 -45 
M5 30 30 10 10 15 15 10 10 9 6 0 0 
M6 0 -9 0 -3 -2 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
Average 20.50 5.50 9.00 -0.58 -5.33 5.83 -2.25 -1.00 1.33 5.25 -7.75 -8.42 
p-value 0.196 0.600 0.035 0.753 0.206 0.116 0.449 0.829 0.291 0.234 0.196 0.425 
CM:                
M1 -89 -5 -20 5 7 -10 -2 0 7 -7 0 0 
M2 60 -60 -16 -40 -25 -45 -25 0 -10 1 1 0 
M3 100 -49 12 0 9 1 7 0 0 3 1 0 
M4 0 0 0 -15 -5 0 0 0 0 0 15 35 
M5 240 0 20 -100 70 -50 0 -5 -20 10 -15 0 
M6 60 0 20 10 30 45 -10 70 0 20 30 -20 
Average 61.83 -19.00 2.67 -23.33 14.33 -9.83 -5.00 10.83 -3.83 4.50 5.33 2.50 
p-value  0.205 0.087 0.670 0.292 0.249 0.459 0.281 0.898 0.425 0.206 0.244 0.898 
CM:    
            M1 0 0 0 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M2 -180 10 -50 -13 -25 0 -10 0 0 -15 0 0 
M3 180 -75 25 1 0 0 0 3 5 -1 0 0 
M4 0 0 0 0 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5 75 0 0 -50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Average 13 -11 -4 -11 -5 0 -2 0 1 -3 0 0 
p-value 0.760 0.567 0.188 0.051 0.035 0.765 0.223 0.978 0.540 0.536 0.302 0.331 
CM:    
            M1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M2 -10 20 -23 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
M3 85 0 40 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 
M4 0 0 0 -35 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
M5 100 50 -75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M6 0 0 -15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Average 29 12 -12 -6 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
p-value 0.782 0.143 0.142 0.835 0.283 0.375 0.073 0.841 0.322 0.603 0.230 0.522 
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Table 3: Diﬀerences between R and A: volatility and volume
The table reports diﬀerences between the risky asset (R) and of the ambiguous asset (A) in the dou-
ble auction (DA) and call markets (CM) for each market where R and A are traded simultaneously
(Sessions DA1, DA2, CM1, CM2) and as a period average. sR−sA is the diﬀerence between the stan-
dard deviation of prices of R and A in DA. qR− qA refers to the diﬀerence between the volume of R
and A in DA and in CM. The p-value refers to a Wilcoxon signed rank test of the null hypothesis that
the diﬀerence is equal to zero (that the measure of interest does not diﬀer between assets R and A).
 
 
Period 
1 
Period 
2 
Period 
3 
Period 
4 
Period 
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
DA:    
            M1 6 54 2 3 -12 7 1 -10 -36 -10 -15 12 
M2 65 6 56 -1 12 -8 -13 14 -2 -10 16 -17 
M3 2 -9 3 -4 -5 -18 1 0 1 3 1 0 
M4 -37 11 8 -2 1 -56 64 1 -7 -3 -7 17 
M5 45 0 2 -6 18 13 -1 0 38 -3 0 -4 
M6 4 10 0 2 -5 -3 -1 15 0 1 -1 1 
Average 14 12 12 -2 2 -11 9 4 -1 -4 -1 2 
p-value  0.173 0.116 0.028 0.345 0.917 0.917 0.345 0.753 0.600 0.173 0.753 0.753 
DA:    
            M1 13 9 34 15 -1 -10 1 -2 -24 -4 12 -5 
M2 3 1 -4 -2 3 -12 -10 -2 -4 -10 13 8 
M3 -15 9 -14 1 10 -11 2 0 12 -2 4 -5 
M4 0 -3 -4 -10 7 -4 -5 8 -17 -4 5 -4 
M5 -3 -6 6 0 -2 -2 16 -9 -6 -10 -4 17 
M6 -4 2 -4 9 6 -6 -2 -2 12 -3 -4 15 
Average -1 2 2 2 4 -8 0 -1 -5 -6 4 4 
p-value 0.597 0.462 0.916 0.673 0.116 0.028 0.834 0.286 0.462 0.027 0.168 0.344 
CM:    
            M1 1 -3 1 0 2 -2 1 3 1 4 2 0 
M2 2 -9 -18 -8 -8 2 -5 3 -7 -1 -3 3 
M3 8 -4 1 0 2 -4 0 5 12 -5 3 4 
M4 -2 -5 4 1 -7 -4 -2 -2 6 -7 4 -6 
M5 2 10 9 -2 3 0 -1 -6 -10 3 0 -6 
M6 4 1 9 -10 12 -4 4 10 -7 0 9 -5 
Average 3 -2 1 -3 1 -2 -1 2 -1 -1 3 -2 
p-value 0.112 0.463 0.343 0.196 0.753 0.109 0.597 0.344 0.753 0.527 0.169 0.291 
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Table 4: Diﬀerences between R and A: distribution of shares
The table reports diﬀerences between the risky asset (R) and of the ambiguous asset (A) in the
double auction (DA) and call markets (CM) for each market where R and A are traded simulta-
neously (Sessions DA1, DA2, CM1, CM2) and as a period average. disR − disA is the diﬀerence
of the standard deviation of end-of-period share holdings. hR − hA is the diﬀerence of the share
holdings of the two traders with the highest number of shares in their end-of-period inventory. The
p-value refers to a Wilcoxon signed rank test of the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence is equal to
zero (that the measure of interest does not diﬀer between assets R and A).
 
 
Period 
1 
Period 
2 
Period 
3 
Period 
4 
Period 
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
CM:    
M1 -1.22 -1.14 0.79 1.14 -0.64 -1.23 0.05 0.61 1.72 0.65 0.95 2.12 
M2 0.86 -4.55 -3.42 -1.13 -1.75 2.11 -1.49 0.80 -3.89 -0.09 -1.20 -0.03 
M3 0.32 0.74 -0.86 -0.74 -0.27 0.48 -0.99 2.22 1.03 -1.08 0.24 -0.53 
M4 -1.09 -2.33 -0.55 0.38 0.80 -1.59 -2.35 -1.92 0.30 -0.69 1.39 -1.06 
M5 0.64 1.46 1.97 -2.15 2.36 -0.37 0.82 -3.28 -3.40 1.21 -1.26 -1.86 
M6 2.16 -2.74 2.22 -3.12 3.54 -2.45 0.22 2.94 -1.87 0.71 3.00 -2.19 
Average 0.28 -1.43 0.02 -0.94 0.67 -0.51 -0.62 0.23 -1.02 0.12 0.52 -0.59 
p-value  0.753 0.173 0.917 0.249 0.463 0.463 0.345 0.753 0.345 0.753 0.463 0.249 
DA:    
M1 0.48 -1.96 0.40 -0.74 1.27 1.55 -2.92 -3.17 0.10 0.58 0.98 -0.03 
M2 -0.88 -0.09 -0.19 1.95 1.86 0.87 1.19 -0.26 2.15 -1.09 -0.93 0.42 
M3 -2.44 -1.10 -1.27 0.33 2.98 3.04 2.37 -0.38 0.22 0.33 -0.79 0.93 
M4 0.89 0.75 -1.77 -3.15 1.81 1.47 -2.33 2.82 -3.78 0.40 1.75 -3.73 
M5 0.00 4.06 1.36 -3.06 1.84 -1.48 -0.82 0.41 2.08 -0.40 0.03 0.93 
M6 0.76 -0.42 -0.93 1.54 -1.53 -1.72 -0.56 -1.48 -0.70 -1.93 -0.09 0.88 
Average -0.20 0.21 -0.40 -0.52 1.37 0.62 -0.51 -0.34 0.02 -0.35 0.16 -0.10 
p-value 0.932 0.866 0.352 0.499 0.063 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.612 0.446 0.612 0.498 
CM:    
M1 -2.44 -1.10 -1.27 0.33 2.98 3.04 2.37 -0.38 0.22 0.33 -0.79 0.93 
M2 0.89 0.75 -1.77 -3.15 1.81 1.47 -2.33 2.82 -3.78 0.40 1.75 -3.73 
M3 0.00 4.06 1.36 -3.06 1.84 -1.48 -0.82 0.41 2.08 -0.40 0.03 0.93 
M4 0.76 -0.42 -0.93 1.54 -1.53 -1.72 -0.56 -1.48 -0.70 -1.93 -0.09 0.88 
M5 -0.20 0.21 -0.40 -0.52 1.37 0.62 -0.51 -0.34 0.02 -0.35 0.16 -0.10 
M6 0.93 0.87 0.35 0.50 0.06 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.61 0.45 0.61 0.50 
Average -0.01 0.73 -0.44 -0.73 1.09 0.40 -0.23 0.25 -0.26 -0.25 0.28 -0.10 
p-value 0.673 0.463 0.345 0.463 0.116 0.753 0.463 0.600 0.917 0.834 0.463 0.462 
DA:    
M1 -0.03 -0.11 0.03 0.09 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.09 
M2 0.00 -0.25 -0.22 -0.06 -0.13 0.09 -0.02 0.05 -0.25 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
M3 0.05 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.13 0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 
M4 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.00 
M5 0.00 0.03 0.11 -0.08 0.17 -0.02 0.03 -0.20 -0.25 0.05 -0.06 -0.16 
M6 0.09 -0.11 0.09 -0.09 0.19 -0.11 0.00 0.14 -0.11 0.02 0.20 -0.08 
Average 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.03 
p-value 0.829 0.115 0.917 0.752 0.600 0.463 0.670 0.753 0.462 0.670 0.670 0.292 
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Table 5: Diﬀerences between R and A: bids in BDM
The table reports the average of diﬀerences between bids (WTP) for the risky asset (R) and for
the ambiguous asset (A). The ﬁrst row shows the averages in Session BDM1 with our primary
operationalization of ambiguity, and the third row reports the averages in Session BDM2 with
ambiguity as a second-order probability (compound lottery). The p-value refers to a Wilcoxon
signed rank test of the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence is equal to zero (that the average bid does
not diﬀer between assets R and A).
 
 
Period 
1 
Period 
2 
Period 
3 
Period 
4 
Period 
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
BDM 1:    200 65 168 36 279 65 240 68 164 31 123 162 
p-value 0.017 0.287 0.025 0.476 0.001 0.169 0.003 0.337 0.005 0.383 0.004 0.015 
BDM 2:    114 115 10 1 117 83 107 142 202 152 156 -14 
p-value 0.170 0.204 0.813 0.809 0.305 0.325 0.195 0.176 0.016 0.132 0.100 0.843 
Appendix
Figure 1: Screenshot of DA split screen
 
Click to buy blue/yellow share at lowest ask. 
Click to sell blue/yellow share at highest bid. 
Quotes to sell 
Quotes to buy 
Time left 
Enter Ask Price, click to submit Enter Bid Price, click to submit Shares and available cash in account in markets 
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Figure 2: Screenshot of CM split screen
 
# of blue shares to buy 
Highest price to buy  
Shares and available cash in account in markets 
# of yellow shares to sell 
Lowest price to sell  
to buy 
Figure 3: Screenshot of BDM split screen
Maximum bid for yellow/blue share 
Available amount of Taler for yellow/blue share 
Yellow/Blue Share 
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Sample of instructions of DA1 and DA2
(not for publication)18
Welcome to the experiment. You participate in this experiment to earn money. Ac-
cordingly, you should try to maximize the payoﬀ in this experiment. If you follow the
instructions carefully, and make good decisions, you will receive a signiﬁcant amount
in cash. In this experiment you trade shares. All transactions are calculated in Taler.
At the end of the experiment your total amount earned in Talers will be exchanged
and paid to you at the following exchange rate: 200 Talers = 1 Euro.
1. Trading in the market
Trading of shares takes place on a market platform. Thus, you ﬁrst have to get
experienced with the trading platform. For the trading actions you need Talers and
shares. You ﬁnd your inventory in Talers and shares in the ﬁeld below the trading
platform.
If you want to sell a share, you can use the text box ENTER SELLING PRICE.
In this text box you enter the price at which you are willing to sell the share. After-
wards click on the SUBMIT button below the text box. Please do this right now
(You can type in any arbitrary price)! Once you have done this, you will recognize that
there are 8 prices (one of each participant) recorded in the schedule named QUOTES
TO SELL on the left-hand side. The lowest quote is listed in the ﬁrst row and is
emphasized. If you click the BUY button you will buy a share at the currently lowest
selling price. If you ﬁrst select an other price on the list by clicking on it, you will
buy the share at the selected price. Please buy a share now by clicking on a price and
then on the BUY button. Now, everybody should own the same amount of shares
as in the beginning, because all of you have oﬀered one share to sell and all of you
have purchased one share.
If you want to buy a share, please use the text box ENTER BUYING PRICE. In
this text box you enter the price at which you are willing to buy the share. Afterwards,
click on the button SUBMIT below the text box. Please, do this right now (You
can type in any arbitrary price)! Once you have done this, you will recognize that
there are 8 prices (one of each participant) recorded in the schedule named QUOTES
TO BUY on the right-hand side. The highest quote is listed in the ﬁrst row and it
is emphasized. If you click the SELL button you will sell a share at the currently
highest buying price. If you ﬁrst select an other price on the list by clicking on it,
you will sell the share at the selected price. Please sell a share now by clicking on a
price and then on the SELL button. Now, everybody should own the same amount
of shares as in the beginning, because all of you have bought one share and all of you
have sold one share.
18Translated from German and formatted in a more compact way than in the actual hand-
outs for the subjects. Note that participants saw the trading screen and interacted with it
while the instructions were read out aloud.
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Remember: If you buy a share, your funds decrease by the purchase price and your
amount of shares increase. If you sell a share, your funds increase by the purchase
price and your amount of shares decrease. The corresponding prices will be recorded
in the list PRICES. The sequence of the prices will depend on the point in time
when the prices are set.
At ﬁrst there will be a 2-minutes trial period. The duration of the period will be
displayed in the upper right corner of the screen. None of your actions in the trial
period will aﬀect your payoﬀ. Thus, these actions will not impact your starting position
in the experiment. The only goal is to get experienced with the trading platform. Make
sure that you successfully submitted bids to buy and to sell. Furthermore ensure that
you at least accepted one bid to buy and one bid to sell. Please feel free to ask questions
during the trial period. Thereafter (in subsequent periods) you will always be given
the possibility to ask questions. Keep in mind: The better you understand the trading
platform, the more you can focus on other important aspects of the experiment.
2. Procedure in one period
In each period you will trade two types of shares in two separate markets: share BLUE
and share YELLOW (this is diﬀerent from the trial period). The markets will be open
for exactly 4 minutes. At the beginning of each period you will be given a separate
endowment of shares and Talers. All the shares you own at the end of the period will
pay you either 300 or 124 Talers each. This payout will be randomly determined (for
more detailed information see Section 3). At the end of each period you will be able
to see the computation of the period's payoﬀ. In total there will be 12 periods.
3. Share payoﬀ
After each period the payoﬀs of the two shares will be determined. For this, a bag
ﬁlled with marbles will be provided for each share.
Share BLUE: For share BLUE every bag will contain 8 marbles with 8 diﬀerent
colors (white, red, purple, blue, black, brown, bright green, dark green).
Share YELLOW: Each of the bags might contain 1 to 8 diﬀerent colors (white, red,
purple, blue, black, brown, bright green, dark green). There will be a diﬀerent bag for
each period, i.e., a total of 12 diﬀerent bags. For each bag all color combinations are
possible. Thus, it might happen that one bag contains exactly 8 marbles of the same
color. However, another possibility is that there is one bag which contains exactly one
marble of all 8 colors. All combinations between these two examples might are also
possible.
As you have seen at the beginning of the experiment, the bags for share YELLOW
have been composed by four randomly picked persons. Each of these persons received
three empty bags and could pick eight marbles of up to eight colors. Thus, these
persons could ﬁll all of these bags with an arbitrary composition of the eight colors.
Afterwards the bags will be closed, so that neither you nor the experimenters will
know the composition of the marbles in the bags. To ensure that there are exactly
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eight marbles in each of the bags, the experimenter will count the marbles through the
fabric of the bags. You can also check this after the experiment yourself if you wish.
The persons who have composed these bags will not take part in the experiment. In
total there are 12 bags (three bags ﬁlled by each of the four persons) which will be
randomly assigned to the 12 periods before we start with the trading.
After each period, each share's value will be determined by the following procedure:
At the beginning of the experiment, you have marked four colors for the share BLUE
and four colors for the share YELLOW. The selections of colors of the whole group
(12 for share BLUE and 12 for share YELLOW) will be randomly assigned to the 12
periods. After each period, one participant will draw exactly one marble out of the
`BLUE bag` to for the BLUE share, and one participant will draw exactly one marble
out of the `YELLOW bag` (that was assigned to that period) for the YELLOW share.
If the drawn marble's color equals one of the four marked colors, then the share's
value is 300 Talers. Otherwise the value is 124 Talers. The value will be entered in the
computer by the supervisor and is shown on your screen in the payoﬀ computation.
4. Endowment and payoﬀ
At the beginning of each period you will get an endowment as shown in the table
below. Four participants receive endowment type I and four participants endowment
type II. These types will be randomly assigned by the computer at the beginning of
in each period. You will have to refund 3000 Talers at the end of each period.
Blue market Yellow market
endowment number available number available
type of shares Talers of shares Talers
I 10 4200 6 5100
II 6 5100 10 4200
You can use the Talers in the BLUE market only for trading in the BLUE market,
and the Talers in the YELLOW market only for trading in the YELLOW market. At
the end of each period, your total Taler payoﬀ is: available Talers at the beginning of
a period + amount of shares × share payoﬀ (300 or 124) + Talers earned by selling
shares - Talers spent on buying shares - refunding of 3000 Talers.
At the end of the experiment, only one period will be paid out in cash. This period
will be determined by a throw of a 12-sided dice. Furthermore, only one market (BLUE
or YELLOW) will be paid out. This market will be determined by a coin toss. Thus,
there is exactly one period (out of all 12 possible periods) of exactly one market (of
share BLUE or YELLOW) which will be paid out to you. Keep in mind that every
decision for each share in each period might be essential for your actual payment! You
receive an additional show-up fee of 4 Euros for your participation in the experiment.
These 4 Euros will be added to your cash payment. The ﬁnal payment in cash is
determined as: Payment (in Euro) = Taler payoﬀ/200 + 4 Euros (show-up fee).
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